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Notes
Express Contracts to Cure: The Nature of
Contractual Malpractice
The term "malpractice"' is often used to refer to any cause of ac-
tion arising from acts or omissions of a physician or surgeon. Properly,
it is applicable only to cases of negligent or improper conduct and thus
should serve as the foundation for actions in tort.2 However, the
term has also been applied to actions arising out of contract.'
Those courts which have addressed the issue have held that a
physician and his patient have the same general liberty to enter into con-
tracts as do other parties,4 and that breach of such a contract will give
rise to a cause of action, irrespective of negligence on the part of the
physician.' Courts have stressed that the agreement to cure or ad-
% Malpractice has been defined as "[t]he treatment of a disease by a physician or
surgeon in an unskilful manner, or in a manner contrary to accepted rules, causing in-
jurious results to the patient." B. MAtoy, THE SIMPLIFIED MEDIcAL DIcrIoNARY FOR
LAWYERS 460 (3d ed. 1960). For the purposes of this note, malpractice actions based on
such conduct will be referred to as "negligent malpractice actions."
2 Negligent malpractice actions are predicated upon a failure to exercise requisite
medical skill and are tortious in nature. Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d
794 (1949). The traditional malpractice action is brought on a tort theory of breach of
a legally imposed standard of diligence and skill derived from the doctor-patient relation-
ship. Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa 629, 70 N.W. 750 (1897), discussed in 5 U. CHI. L.
REv. 156 (1937).
3 Actions arising from a physician's breach of an express contract to cure, adminis-
ter treatment, or obtain a specified result are loosely referred to as "contractual mal-
practice actions."
Suits against physicians are not limited to one theory of rec overy. Cf. FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(e) (2), IND. TRIAL R. 8(E) (2). Thus it is not unusual to include both a "negli-
gent malpractice" count and a "contractual malpractice" count in the same suit. See, e.g.,
Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971), where a physician was found
not negligent yet liable on a contract count. See also notes 34-45 infra & text accompany-
ing.
- Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961) ; Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118,
150 So. 2d 35 (1963) ; Alexander v. Alton Ochsner Medical Fcundation, 276 So. 2d 794
(La. App. 1973) (by implication) ; Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973) ;
Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957) ; Robias v. Finestone, 308 N.Y.
543, 129 N.E.2d 330 (1955) ; Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949) ;
Kernodle v. Elder, 23 Okla. 743, 102 P. 138 (1909); Brooks v. Herd, 144 Wash. 173,
257 P. 238 (1927).
5Coon v. Vaughn, 64 Ind. 89, 91 (1878):
In such a case, we do not think the negation of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is necessary. Indeed, the undertaking, though soundilg in tort, is founded
in contract-to do a certain thing upon a consideration-and the breaches are
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minister a prescribed treatment must be express.' In addition, the
contract must be supported by consideration." In some instances, such
agreements may even require consideration beyond that paid for the
physician's normal services! This note will explore the theoretical bases
of liability in contractual malpractice actions and suggest ways in
which contract theory may be profitably employed in a malpractice
setting. Specifically, this note will examine three issues which are pres-
ent in all such cases and thus underlie the proper application of a con-
tract approach: (1) enforceability of the contract, (2) proof of the
contractual intent of the parties, and (3) the measure of liability for
breach.
"Express contract" is used in this note to refer to a contract for a
specific result, cure, or designated treatment. This is distinguished from
an "implied contract" to exercise requisite skill and care." Express con-
alleged.
See also Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940); Safian v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1940).
IBecause of the potential magnitude of liability and the ease of fabrication of
claims, proof of the existence of the contract must be clear. See, e.g., Sullivan v. O'Con-
nor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971).
See also cases cited in Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1230-33 (1972) ; id. (Supp. 1974). Many
courts have stated that physicians do not warrant the results of their work, and that such
agreements will not be implied. See id. In fact, it has been suggested that the require-
ment of an express agreement be given statutory embodiment. Tierney, Contractual As-
pects of Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. RFv. 1457, 1480 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Contrac-
tual Aspects]. But where an express contract is well pleaded, the availability of a paral-
lel remedy in tort is no bar. See, e.g., Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159 (1874) ; see also
note 3 supra. But cf. Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
7 See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1233 (1972).8 Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571 (1973) ; Gault v. Sideman, 42
Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436 (1963) (dictum); Wilson v. Blair, 65 Mont. 155, 211 P.
289 (1922). See generally 61 Am. JuR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers § 149
(1972). But cf. Doerr v. Villate, 74 111. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
These cases deal with the formation of a bilateral contract formed through the ex-
change of a promise to pay for a promise (or guarantee) to cure, treat, etc. This situa-
tion is distinguished from the case of an implied warranty, where the patient's promise
to pay the normal service fee is given in exchange for the physician's implied promise to
treat with requisite skill and care. See note 9 infra. The distinction is perhaps best
drawn by examining the concept of an "additional consideration" requirement for the
physician's guarantee. This requirement presupposes a double transaction in contractual
malpractice cases: (1) the exchange of a promise to pay a normal fee for the physi-
cian's promise (implied) to administer appropriate treatment with the requisite skill and
care, and (2) a promise by the patient to give consideration above the normal fee in
exchange for the express guarantee of cure by the physician.
9 It has been suggested that reference to this "implied" duty under a contract label
creates confusion with respect to applicable statutes of limitation and the appropriate
measure of damages. Accordingly, the contract theory should be abandoned insofar as
it merely implies an agreement to exercise the standards of skill and care required by
tort law. D. LouIsELL. & H. WILLIAMS, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8.03, at 199 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has offered the terms "status" and "relation"
[Vol. 50:361
MEDICAL CONTRACTS TO CURE
tracts generally fall into two categories: (1) contracts which provide
that the physician will render a specified amount of service, in terms of
time or a diagnostic or therapeutic objective, for a certain amount of
money;1" and (2) contracts of a medical nature which provide that the
physician will effect a cure, obtain a specified result, administer a pre-
scribed treatment, or refrain from employing a c,.-rtain procedure."
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
The increasing volume of medical malpractice litigation in recent
years has placed heavy burdens upon courts and the health professions.
Malpractice suits have increased by leaps and bounds in recent
years, by about eight to ten percent per year. As every judge
knows, they are difficult to try and have a sweeping effect on the
medical profession and the public. Doctors become extremely
cautious, hospitalize patients for minor matters, Crder unnecessary
tests and X-rays and refuse to handle some case& at all. Further,
insurance rates have increased . . . and inexperienced doctors
cannot obtain coverage at all unless connected with a firm.' 2
Indeed, in the past few years many insurance companies have with-
to describe the relationship of the doctor and his patient:
While the law of contracts is applied as between a patient and his physician
or surgeon, when a person consults a physician or surgeon, seeking treatment
for a physical ailment, real or apparent, and the physician or surgeon agrees to
accept him as a patient, it does not create a contract in tI e sense that term is
ordinarily used. Usually there is no specification or particuilarization as to what
the physician shall do. The patient selects, and commits himself to the care of,
the doctor because he is confident the doctor possesses tle requisite skill and
ability to treat-and will treat-his physical ailment and restore him to normal
good health. The physician, after diagnosing the ailment, prescribes the treat-
ment or the medicine to be administered; but the patient is tnder no legal obliga-
tion to follow the physician's instructions. Thus it is apt and perhaps more exact
to say it creates a status or relation rather than a contract.
Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 360, 90 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1956).
Where courts accept an implied contract theory, the standards of performance in
contract are substantially the same as in tort. Compare XV. Pr.ossm, HANDBOOK OF TH.
LAW OF TORTS 162 (4th ed. 1971), with REsTATEMENT OF CONTr<AcTs § 314, Illustration 7
(1932). At least 25 states have rules that such a malpractice action must be brought in
tort and not in "implied" contract. Comment, The Implied Contract Theory of Malprac-
tice Recovery, 6 WiLLAmurE L.J. 275, 278 n.22 (1970).
20 See, e.g., Klein v. Williams, 194 Miss. 699, 12 So. 2d 421 (1943) (contract to pro-
vide medical services for the employees of a mill). See also MuICAL MALPRACrICE
8.10, at 225.
1 See, e.g., Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2 330 (1955) (defendant
promised to cure plaintiff by a specific method, in a specific time) ; Stewart v. Rudner,
349 Mich. 459, 84 NAV.2d 816 (1957) (defendant contracted to perform a Caesarean sec-
tion on the plaintiff and did not; child was stillborn). See also MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ff
8.10, at 225.
12 Van Valkenburg, Can Our Courts Be Saved?, 50 MIcI. ST. B.J. 75 (1971).
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drawn altogether from the field of malpractice coverage.18
It can be predicted that the growing volume of malpractice litiga-
tion,'1 4 coupled with the increasing difficulty of obtaining liability in-
surance, 5 will give rise to a "toughening" of the tort standards of proof
required in medical actions. Such a judicial reaction to the malpractice
dilemma would make the contract action even more attractive, because
breaches of contract are easier to prove than torts and because statutes
of limitation for contracts often provide a longer period in which to
bring suit than do statutes of limitation for torts.1"
At present, however, the courts attempt to cope with the increasing
18 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIVE REORG. OF THE SENATE CoMM. ON Gov'T
OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE
PHYSICIAN 2 (Comm. Print 1969).
14 In 1970, on an average working day, the 26 or so major malpractice insurance com-
panies opened approximately 70 medical malpractice claim files, or about 18,000 files for
the year. About 70 percent of these files, or about 12,600 annually, represent actual
claims asserted by patients. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT].
15 See notes 13-14 supra & text accompanying. Furthermore, it appears reasonable
to conclude that few insurers in the field will voluntarily undertake coverage of the physi-
cian's guarantees of results, even for much increased premiums, because the inherent risk
is so unpredictable that rational rate setting is impossible. Contractual Aspects, supra
note 6, at 1474-75.
"I See, e.g., Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529, aft'd, 254 N.Y.
620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930).
Absent an express contract the gravamen of the malpractice action is tortious.
See cases cited note 2 supra.
It is true that usually a consensual relationship exists and the physician
agrees impliedly to treat the patient in a proper manner. Thus, a malpractice
suit is inextricably bound up with the idea of breach of implied contract. How-
ever, the patient-physician relationship, and the corresponding duty that is owed,
is not one that is completely dependent upon a contract theory. . . . On prin-
ciple then, we consider a malpractice action as tortious in nature whether the
duty grows out of a contractual relation or has no origin in contract.
Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 844-45 (5th Cir. 1959).
However some courts still allow actions brought under either a tort or a contract
theory, even where no express agreement exists. Compare Wolfe v. Virusky, 306 F.
Supp. 519 (S.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 470 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1972), with
Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224- (1964).
The time for commencement of actions for negligent malpractice is often limited by
special statutes, and a number of malpractice statutes limit the time during which the ac-
tion may be commenced regardless of the label attached to the action (i.e., contract or
tort). See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp. 1973) (four years, or one year
after discovery, whichever occurs first) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-4-19-1 (Code ed. 1973)
(two years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4 (Supp. 1974) (three years). See D.
HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 247-70 (1973). See also Note, Medical Malpiactice:
A Survey of Statutes of Limitation, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. Rxv. 597 (1969).
Nineteen jurisdictions now have limitation statutes expressly applicable to mal-
practice actions: Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Ill., Ind., Ky., Maine, Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Mo., Neb., N.H., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, S.D. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 9,
13.01, at 363-64 (Supp. 1973).
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volume by applying various legal doctrines. Unfortunately, they have
applied these doctrines unevenly. The availability of the contract
remedy17 is not alone responsible for the confusion. Traditional tort
concepts, such as res ipsa loquitur, yield uneven results when applied to
the medical arts.1 One possible solution would be to treat the field of
malpractice as sui generis, generating its own rules of liability apart
from traditional tort and contract notions. 9 Yet, the application of
17 Dietz, Baird, & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in CommIssIoN RE-
PORT, Appendix 87, at 128-29, Table 111-57, contains a tabulation of the frequency of ap-
plication of key legal issues and doctrines in appellate malpractice decisions. Warranty/
contract breach was found to be a key issue in 1.7% of the pre-1950 decisions examined.
This increased to 2.0% for those decisions rendered between 1050 and 1960, and rose to
4.6% for the period 1961-1971. The average number of legal doctrines applied in each
case varied between 2.04 and 2.16 for the three periods examined.
Similarly, warranty/contract breach was deemed significant to the outcome of mal-
practice appeals in 0.7% of the cases examined prior to 1950, 1.6% for the 1950-1960
period, and 2.7% for the period 1961-1971. Id. at 129-30, Table 111-58.
18 "The Commission FINDS that some courts have applied .ertain legal doctrines for
the purpose of creating or relieving the liability of health prof"essionals. The Commis-
sion further FINDS that such special doctrines, or the applicat,on thereof, are no longer
justified." COMMISSION REPORT at 31 (emphasis in original).
Among those legal doctrines which have been applied unevenly in malpractice actions
the commission listed:
(1) the doctrine of informed consent to treatment,
(2) the discovery rule under the statute of limitations,
(3) the terms of the statute of limitations,
(4) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
(5) liability for breach of express contracts.
Perhaps the most important area of increasing litigation where legal doctrines have
been abused to the detriment of the medical professions is the ,.rea of informed consent
Courts have imposed an affirmative duty of disclosure upon physicians, whether or not
the patient has inquired as to specific risks. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 1(4 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
The patient must be adequately informed of potential risks so ttat his consent to a given
procedure can be an "effective" or "informed" one. See Comintsion REPORir a 29-30.
11 A limited statutory plan for imposed 'arbitration has recently been enacted in New
Hampshire for all liability claims against professionals (including lawyers), without re-
gard to the amount of the claim. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 519-A (Supp. 1973). The
decision of the arbitrator is not final; it may be accepted or rejected by the parties, who
may thereafter settle or sue.
In Philadelphia County and Allegheny County in Pennsylvania, the courts have in-
stituted a rule requiring arbitration for all tort disputes involving less than $10,000.
Again the arbitration is not binding and either party may demand a court trial." CommIs-
SION REPORT at 92.
The Commission Report recommends more widespread use of imposed arbitration as
an alternative method for resolving small malpractice disputes providing the arbitration
mechanisms have certain characteristics and do not pre-empr contractual arbitration
agreements. Id. at 93-94. See generally id., Appendix, at 214-449 (five articles)'; Wini-
koff, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approacz to Medical Malpractice
Claims, 13 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 695 (1972).
The advantages of arbitration, either by agreement or by statute, are that it (1)
speeds handling of claims, (2) saves time of the parties, witness;es, and their legal coun-
sel, (3) permits the use of sophisticated expert decisionmakers, (4) promotes informal
proceedings in which the technical rules of evidence may be relaxed, (5) assures that
1975]
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contract theory has not contributed to the confusion to an extent justify-
ing the exemption of doctors from the common law of contracts.
THE DUAL NATURE OF THE CONTRACT ACTION
Various arguments have been offered against ever enforcing ex-
press agreements to cure, treat, or obtain a specified result. Some courts
have concluded that such contracts retard the advancement of medical
science and, as such, are contrary to public policy.2" It has also been
suggested that such contracts, if enforced, would foster the practice
of "defensive medicine"'" and would discourage the physician from
the decision rendered is final with a very limited potential for appeal, (6) encourages
a fact-finding procedure without the emotional overtones and adversary atmosphere of
a courtroom.
Critics of arbitration claim that (1) arbitration will encourage small or nuisance
claims, (2) a more sophisticated tribunal might place greater value on loss of income
and pain and suffering than a jury would, (3) an arbitration procedure might lead to
more compromise judgments rather than to clear decisions of fault or no-fault, (4) the
nonpublic nature of the process avoids the pressure of publicity as a device for stimulat-
ing improvements in health-care practices. CoMMISsioN REPORT at 94.
Another proposal calls for implementation of a no-fault recovery system for medi-
cal injuries. See Rotll and Rosenthal, Non Fault Based Medical Injury Compensation
Systems, in COMMISSION REPORT, Appendix, at 450; Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-
Accident" Inmrance: A Needed First Step Toward the Displacement of Liability for
"Medical Malpractice," 31 U. Cxi. L. REv. 279 (1964).
Just as negligence actions would disappear under a strict liability, or no-fault re-
covery system, presumably the contract action would also be eliminated in part. If in-
jured, the complainant would be required to show only that he was injured while receiv-
ing medical care, regardless of negligence or express contract on the part of the physician.
20 This argument has most often been voiced with respect to contracts to perform,
or warranties of, a sterilization. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1251 (1972). However
it has been held in a variety of circumstances that such contracts are not, per se, un-
enforceable. See cases cited id. at 1252-55.
A more perplexing problem may be whether or not the court should allow the jury to
find damages for breach where the patient is "blessed" by the birth of a normal and
healthy child. Some courts have held that there are no damages due to the breach in
cases of consequent birth of a normal child. E.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123,
255 N.W. 620 (1934); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 6 Lycoming Rptr. 19
(1957); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964). But see Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). Another court has held that the
birth of a normal child would not preclude recovery because the birth was not a factor
vitiating liability but rather one which merely mitigates damages. Jackson v. Anderson,
230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970).
An argument in favor of enforcing contracts to cure, which is applicable to steriliza-
tion cases, was presented by the court in McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 A. 881
(1932) :
[I] f the promise were held illegal, a patient ignorant of its illegality would be
misled in placing reliance on it, while if he were aware of its lack of binding
force, his knowledge would tend to prevent confidence in it and the gain of free-
dom of statement would be lost in its known irresponsibility. The proposed
policy is not perceived to have any healing value sufficient to demand its adoption.
Id. at 302-03, 157 A. at 883.
21 "Defensive medicine" refers to "the alteration of modes of medical practice, in-
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reassuring the distraught and fearful patient. One judge has sug-
gested that the enforcement of these contracts in the physician-patient
context presumes that enforcement of like agreements is required in the
context of other confidential relationships where svtch enforcement may
work injustice.2 2  One may also argue that because medicine is an
inexact and developing science, a cure is often impossible despite the
most skillful efforts of the physician. It seems unwise to punish a
physician where he has manifested no blameworthy conduct, particularly
because actions based upon breach of contract are usually not covered
by malpractice insurance.23
duced by the threat of liability, for the principal purposes of 2'orestalling the possibility
of lawsuits by patients as well as providing a good legal defe;ise in the e'ent such law.
suits are instituted." Coix~IlssioN REPORT at 14 (emphasis in original).
The Commission Report further defined the two princip:I forms which defensive
medicine may take:
Positive Defensive Medicine is the conducting of a test or performance of a
diagnostic or therapeutic procedure which is not medically justified but is carried
out primarily (if not solely) to prevent or defend against the threat of medical-
legal liability.
Negative Defensive Medicine occurs when a physiciart does not perform a
procedure or conduct a test because of the physician's fear of a later malpractice
suit, even though the patient is likely to benefit from the test or procedure in
question.
Id.
A third form of defensive medicine practice involves professional reluctance to pub-
lish case reports of adverse effects of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures for fear they
will be used as evidence in a subsequent lawsuit. See generally Bernzweig, Defensive
Medicine, in CoihmisSIoN REPORT, Appendix, at 38-40; Project-The Medical Malprac-
tice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuKE L.J. 939; Suing the Doctor: A
Rising Problem, 70 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 70 (March 8, 1971) ; STAFF OF SUBcoMM.
ON EXECUTIVE REORG. OF THE SENATE Coii. ON GOV'T OPI:'LATioNS, 91ST CONG., 1ST
SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE Pu YSIcIAN 2 (Comm. Print
1969).
22 See Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971) (Black, J., dis-
senting). A hypothetical situation presented by Justice Black concerns an indignant cli-
ent who insists in court that his attorney promised, for consideration, a damage verdict
and judgment for no less than a specified amount, or promised a decree saving client's
home from foreclosure, or promised a successful contest of a well or a successful action
against an insurer. Id. at 90, 188 N.W.2d at 617.
The most vexing case arises from a common situation in which an attorney recom-
mends to his client that he not accept an offered settlement. Tf e attorney will surely use
optimistic words with respect to the results of subsequent negotiation or litigation, and if
these words may be construed to be warranties of success, then the attorney may be liable
for a subsequent breach of this "express contract." See Sifers v. Horen, 22 Mich. App.
351, 177 NAV.2d 189 (1970).2 3 Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1227 (1972). See Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260
App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1940), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 649, 36 N.E.2d 692 (1941); Ber-
man v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 916, 10 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1939). Some policies
cover the physician regardless of the theory of recovery. Letter from David R Edwards,
Counsel, Aetna Life and Casualty Co., to Gary L. Birnbaum, Aug. 19, 1974 (on file with
the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL). Cf. McGee v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 53 F.2d
953 (lst Cir. 1931). The New York cases may be distinguished on the grounds that they
19751
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Notwithstanding these arguments, courts have recognized and en-
forced such contracts, although they often appear reluctant to allow
recovery in the absence of clear proof that an express agreement actually
has been made.24 This reluctance may be based upon judicial recogni-
tion of the peculiar dual nature of contractual malpractice. An analysis
of the spectrum of contractual malpractice cases will suggest that courts
have been correct in enforcing such contracts. For analytic purposes,
the extremes of this spectrum, in terms of similarity to commonplace
bargaining situations, may be designated as "primary" and "secondary"
cases. The primary-secondary form of analysis is employed, not because
cases fit the extremes, but because the extreme cases illustrate the factors
competing in the normal hybrid action.
The "Primary" Case
The "primary" case refers to a situation in which the patient is
neither under a compulsion to obtain medical treatment, nor under a
compulsion to seek the services of a particular physician. Thus, the
physician employed, the time and place of the treatment, the costs, the
specific guarantees, and any agreement to administer a prescribed treat-
ment are all variables subject to negotiation between the patient and the
doctor.
In this context an express contract would arise from the following
hypothetical colloquy:
Patient: Doctor, I would like to have my nose shortened one
inch.
Doctor: That shouldn't present any problem. It will cost
$1,000.
involved policies which prohibited the physician from entering into special contracts to
cure.
A New York court has held that a physician is not covered for contractual liability
by an insurance contract covering claims arising out of "malpractice, error or mistake."
The court noted:
If a doctor makes a contract to effect a cure and fails to do so, he is liable for
breach of contract even though he use the highest possible professional skill. In-
surance of such a contract would protect only medical charlatans. The honor-
able member of the medical profession is more keenly conscious than the rest of
us that medicine is not an exact science, and he undertakes only to give his best
judgment and skill. He knows he cannot warrant a cure.
Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 768, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (1940). Contra,
Sutherland v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 103 Wash. 583, 175 P. 187 (1918).
24 See cases cited note 6 supra. See also cases cited in Miller, The Contractual Li-
ability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WAsI. U.L.Q. 413, 416 n.16; and in Annot., 43
A.L.R.3d 1221, 1229-33, 1244-46 (1972).
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Patient: I want you to promise that I will look just like this
picture when you are finished.
Doctor: I really can't promise that.
Patient: I will give you $2,000 if you guarantee the result.
Doctor: I accept.
Although this colloquy does not include all possible characteristics of
a "primary" situation, it does serve to illustrate a situation closely ap-
proximating the "pure primary" case.
Reasons for enforcing an express agreement reached in this con-
text may be suggested. Once the patient has made the decision to seek
the services of a particular physician, the content and form of the agree-
ment are predominantly in the control of the physician. To the extent
that only the physician can assess the inherent risks, his own skills, the
technologies available to his profession, and his ability to absorb the
potential liability, he assumes a superior bargaining position. Based on
his assessment of the situation (including the patient's ability to pay),
the physician establishes a price for his services. At this point the
patient, lacking the information available to the physician, can only ac-
cept or reject the offer.2" The argument that enforcing an agreement
made in this context fosters defensive medicine practices is not per-
suasive.28
In reliance upon the promise of the physician, the patient has
either postponed or forfeited the opportunity to seek professional assist-
ance elsewhere. In return, the physician has promised to administer a
25 It is a rare situation (perhaps where the patient is a physician) in which the per-
ception of risks and knowledge of procedures and instrumentalities available is balanced
between the parties.
28 This conclusion follows from analysis of the definition of "defensive medicine"
provided by the Commission Report at note .21 supra. Defensive medicine is a mode of
medical practice itself induced by the threat of liability. It is predicated upon the physi-
cian's "pre-operative" attempt to establish a good defense in the case of a subsequent
negligence action and upon the physician's inability to protect against all possible, and of-
ten unforeseeable, consequences of his work See id., Positive Defensive Medicine.
These rationales have little force in the primary case where tbe threat of a subsequent
negligent malpractice suit bears no relevance to the issue of enforceability of express
contractual guaranties. The issue is merely breach of contrac: regardless of the cause
of the breach. The problem of defensive medicine exists in the primary case only to the
extent that it exists in any medical situation, i.e., to encourage physicians to employ (or
not employ) certain procedures as safety measures against subs,. quent negligence actions.
The defensive medicine dilemma thus presents no support for the contention that con-
tractual guaranties of cure should not be found or that they should not be enforced.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the physician, in warranting good results,
has contractually assumed the risk that some unforeseen complication will arise during
the course of treatment, and he faces potential contractual liability for the consequences
of such a complication even if he employes the highest degree of care.
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specified treatment or to obtain a specified result. No public policy
seems to be served by denying binding effect to express agreements made
in this manner."
It has been suggested that the doctor be permitted to include an ex-
culpatory clause in the agreement to obtain a specific result.2" Such a
clause might protect the interests of the charlatan rather than those
of the skilled physician. Courts may find such clauses contrary to public
policy and refuse to enforce them. 9
On the other hand the principles that allow physicians to enter into
express contracts should also allow them to disclaim an express con-
tract. It would be inconsistent for the law to prohibit physicians from
disavowing contractual liability,0 and there appears to be no policy
reason why exculpation from liability under express warranties should
not be permitted (although it is at least arguable that the superior bar-
gaining position of the physician necessitates careful scrutiny of any
such exculpatory provision). If the doctor has no contractual intent
there is no justification for prohibiting him from so stating, in writing,
so as to avoid misconstruction of subsequent words of therapeutic
reassurance. Indeed Guilmet v. Campbell"' seems to require such excul-
patory clauses in order to protect the interests of the medical profes-
sion. 2 An analysis of Guilmet will illustrate the "bargaining" atmos-
phere in which an enforceable contract might arise.8"
27 See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1227 (1972).
28 Miller, mupra note 24, at 420. Miller's discussion concerns an agreement which
would absolve the physician of any and all liability whether based on negligence or pur-
ported representation. This discussion seems too broad. The law with respect to ex-
culpation from negligence in this context appears to be both firm and correct in denying
enforcement of such clauses. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92,
383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
29 Cf. Hales v. Raines, 162 Mo. App. 46, 141 S.W. 917 (1911) The court held an ex-
culpatory clause contrary to public policy where it sought to expunge liability for the
physician's negligence. However, exculpation was allowed with respect to risks attend-
ing nonnegligent treatment, at least suggesting the possibility of relief from contract li-
ability for injuries resulting despite the employment of due skill and care. Id. at 66-67,
141 S.W. at 923.
30 Contractual Aspects, supra note 6, at 1475.
sl 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1972), discussed infra notes 34-45 & text accom-
panying.
32Professor Tierney suggests a disclaimer which might read as follows: "The physi-
cian gives no guarantee that the treatment recommended will cure the patient or improve
his health, or that his health after treatment will be better than, or as good as, it was
before." Contractual Aspects at 1478.
33 The key question is still the intention of the parties, or, more precisely, the ques-
tion may be the plaintiff's perception of the physician's intent. For example, in Guilinet
v. Campbell, the doctor clearly did not intend to give a guarantee. See 385 Mich. at 70,
188 N.W.2d at 606. Modem contract theory, however, does not require subjective intent
to bind the promisor. RESTATEMENT OF CONnAcTs § 20 (1932). Professor Tierney, in
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The "Primary" Case in Practice
Guilmet v. Campbell34 presents a fact situation which serves as an
example of the "primary" case. In the fall of 1963 the plaintiff suffered
nearly fatal bleeding through a peptic ulcer. In January 1964, he went
to see the defendant surgeon, "curious about an operation, if I should
have one, or if I shouldn't have one."' '35 The surgeon never indicated that
an operation was necessary. The defendant testified that prior to the
operation the plaintiff was in excellent physical health and that the opera-
tion was not an emergency. 6 The plaintiff testified that in the course
his excellent article on the Guilnet case, notes that section 20 of the RESTATEMENT is
qualified by section 71(c) : "If either party knows that the other does not intend what
his words or acts express, this knowledge prevents such word,. or other acts from being
operative as an offer or an acceptance." Contractual Aspects 2t 1462 n.16. He questions
whether a patient should know that the physician's words are not to be relied upon as a
guarantee because no honorable physician warrants a cure. Sec note 23 supra. This view
requires, of course, a priori acceptance of the proposition that no honorable physician
warrants a cure. Whether or not this be the case, it may be preferable to say that in the
primary case a physician might warrant a cure in exchange for additional compensation.
Professor Tierney concludes that even though section 71(c) requires actual knowl-
edge on the part of the plaintiff, it is arguable that such knowledge should be imputed to
the patient because, again, no reputable surgeon would warrant a cure in the light of the
"common knowledge of the uncertainty which attends all surgical operations ... 
Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 116, 146 A. 641, 643 (1929).
The courts are generally very wary of interpreting words against the physi-
cian, basically because of the aspect of therapeutic reassurance. To look only at
the mere words used by the physician and to ignore the surrounding circum-
stances behind the utterance is clearly a mistake. Thus in Marvin v. Talbot [216
Cal. App. 2d 383, 30 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1963)] the words "I will make a new man
out of you" were held to be insufficient, while in Bailey v. Harmon [74 Colo.
390, 222 P. 393 (1924)] a promise to make the plaintiff "a model of harmonious
perfection" was held to be a term of the contract."
Note, Establishing the Contractual Liability of Physicians, 7 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 84, 97
(1974) (footnotes omitted).
Note also that in Bria v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 153 Conn. 626, 220 A.2d 29 (1966), the
physician said he would see that "whatever was necessary was done," id. at 629, 220 A.2d
at 30, and the court held that this was not a warranty to personally guarantee that no
unexpected or unusual consequences would result. Id. at 632, 220 A.2d at 32.
34385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971), aff'g 16 Mich. App. 322, 167 N.W.2d 79
(1969). A thorough and critical review of this case may be found in Contractual Aspects,
supra note 6.
35 385 Mich. at 62, 188 N.W.2d at 603.
36 Id. at 62, 188 N.W.2d at 603. The facts of this case have been simplified for
analysis. When plaintiff suffered nearly fatal bleeding from Ids ulcer in 1963, he was
being treated by a Dr. Klewicki. It was Dr. Klewicki who recommended the surgeons
Kenneth N. Campbell and Joseph A. Arena, the defendants in he principal case. Id. at
61, 188 N.W.2d at 603.
For the purposes of this analysis the statements in the text are adopted from the
majority opinion of Justice Kavanagh. In the actual case the situation may have more
closely approximated an emergency situation than the "primary" case which the majority
portrays. Justice Black, in an Addendum (June 21, 1971) to his unusually strong and
pointed dissent, notes that when Dr. Campbell was summoned in December 1963, Mr.
Guilmet was in or near extremis suffering from ulcerous intcrnal bleeding which had
sent him to the hospital in an unconscious state. Subsequently, at the hospital and then
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of consultation, the physician made numerous references to the ease
of the operation3 7 the lack of need for future medication,"8 and the
postoperative health of the patient. 9 The physician contended that these
were not words of guarantee or contractual intent.
4 0
On the day following the operation a specialist in thoracic surgery
examined the plaintiff and diagnosed that a ruptured esophagus, due
to surgical trauma, had resulted from the operation." Eventually the
plaintiff endured three subsequent operations, the insertion of tubes to
drain excess fluid, and hepatitis. These procedures resulted in bodily
scars, an 82-pound weight loss, physical weakness, and other effects.",
On these facts the trial judge submitted the case to the jury, 8 which
at home, the defendant was nursed slowly to that state of health which would permit
the operation as recommended. At the time of the operation the plaintiff's stomach was
found to be so diseased that 80 percent of it had to be removed. Id. at 95, 188 N.W.2d at
619 (Black, J., dissenting).3 7 According to the plaintiff's testimony, at the first consultation with the defendant
the following conversation took place:
"Q. What was the conversation as you recall it?
"A. Well, he explained to me how they do this operation, and at that time
he told me that him and his associate, Dr. Arena, were specialists, and there
was nothing to it at all. It was a very simple operation according to them."
Id. at 62, 188 N.W.2d at 603 (emphasis supplied by the court).
88 Q. What was the discussion about the future use of medication?
"A. Well, he said, 'after this operation, you can throw your pillbox away, your
Maalox you can throw away,' and then he come up with an example.
"Q. Give the example.
"A. The example was that 'In twenty years if you could figure out what you
spent for Maalox pills and doctors [sic] calls, you could buy an awful lot.
Weigh it against an operation."'
Id. at 63, 188 N.W.2d at 604 (emphasis supplied by the court).
39 "A. . . . He told me, he said, 'Once you have an operation, it takes care of
all your troubles,' and he said, 'You can eat as you want to, you can drink as you
want to, you can go as you please."'
385 Mich. at 62, 188 N.W.2d at 603.
"Q. Was there any discussion as to where it would take place, how long you'd
be convalescing in the hospital?
"A. He said, 'Beaumont Hospital.' I'd probably be in four to five days and
then I'd be off work mnaybe another two to three weeks."
Id. at 63, 188 N.W.2d at 603 (emphasis supplied by the court).
40 The doctors' contention is at least partially supported by the leading case of Haw-
kins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 115, 146 A. 641, 643 (1929), which held that "prediction as
to the probable duration of the treatment and plaintiff's resulting disability, and the fact
that these estimates were exceeded would impose no contractual liability upon the de-
fendant." This principle would appear to cover the alleged statement by Dr. Campbell
that Mr. Guilmet would be out of work "three to four weeks at the most." 385 Mich. at
68, 188 N.W.2d at 606. See Contractual Aspects at 1465-66.
41 385 Mich. at 64, 188 N.W.2d at 604. Dr. Wood testified that the mortality rate
from a ruptured esophagus is 50 to 75 percent.
42 Id. at 64, 188 N.W.2d at 604.
43 The judge overruled a defense motion for a directed verdict and sent the case to
the jury, stating in his ruling:
"Turning to the matter of contract, it is true the Plaintiff Richard Guilmet,
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returned a verdict of "no negligence" on a tort count, but awarded the
plaintiff $50,000 for breach of contract. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals"' and the Michigan Supreme Court" affirmed.
As in the conceptual "primary" case, the plaintiff in Guilmnet was
under no compulsion to proceed with the operation at any specific time
or under the supervision of any one surgeon. Whether the contract to
cure was actually offered and accepted was correctly deemed a matter
for jury determination as it would be in any clearly commercial trans-
action." In such a situation once a jury has determined the existence
of an offer, acceptance, and breach, there is no reason why a contract
should not be enforced and a damage remedy afforded the injured party.
The "Secondary" Case
Simply stated, the "secondary" case situation is an emergency
situation. The patient is under an immediate compulsion to use a par-
ticular physician at a certain time, at a specified place, and at a desig-
nated price, without bargaining, for fear that delay might have serious
consequences. As opposed to the "primary" case where the physician
was free to set the terms of the contract and the patient was free
to reject those terms, the "secondary" case lacks this "bargaining"
atmosphere.
Furthermore, in an emergency situation the physician has a pro-
in his testimony, direct testimony, said that he talked with Dr. Campbell and Dr.
Campbell said the operation would take care of all his troubles, and he could
do as he pleased afterwards; that it was a simple operation, said that he per-
formed it very often and he would be out of work four x eeks and there was
no danger.
"Now again, this Court would doubt whether those ;tatements were all
made, particularly after having listened to the Doctor, and xhile it is true that
the Doctor is not required to guarantee his work, I supposc there is no reason
why a medical doctor can't do that if he wishes, as well as =ny other person, so
there is testimony here from which the Jury might reasonably infer that a con-
tract was made to do these things as Mr. Guilmet testified ....
"Well, the record indicates, according to my notes thz t Plaintiff Richard
Guilmet had a conversation with Dr. Campbell prior to the operation, ...
if this be the conversation and if the Jury accepts it, they zwould be in position
to conclude that this Defendant Doctor had assured the plai'ntiff of the success
of his operation, and having failed in that respect, they zjould be liable for
damages."
Id. at 65-66, 188 N.W.2d at 604-05 (quoting the trial judge's instructions) (emphasis
added by the supreme court).
"16 Mich. App. 322, 167 N.W.2d 798 (1969).
45 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
46 The qualitative distinction betveen a physician-patient relationship and that of a
shopkeeper and his customer is significant, in the theoretical "prinmary" case, only to the
extent that it is to be considered by the fact-finder in construing the words of the parties.
Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 70, 188 N.W.2d 601, 607 (1971).
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fessional obligation to aid the patient,47 including therapeutic reassur-
rance when it is required.4" In addition, without prior examination, the
physician may know little more about the illness than the disabled
patient. He can not calculate the eventual costs of his services, nor can
he make allowance for the possibility of postoperative legal actions.
Policy factors might now determine that, as a matter of law, a
contract cannot arise in a purely "secondary" case. Although it has
been argued that the line between a promise and an opinion is not "so
narrow and shadowy" that the doctor is unable to choose one expression
in clear distinction from another," this line may indeed be too indistinct
in an emergency situation. It may not be a simple matter for the doctor
to make it clear to a suffering patient that he cannot guarantee good
results."0 Furthermore, psychological care and comfort may be instru-
mental in preparing the patient for the ordeal of emergency surgery.
47 A physician may choose whom he will serve. In an emergency, however, he
should render service to the best of his ability. Having undertaken the care of
a patient, he may not neglect him; and unless he has been discharged he may
discontinue his services only after giving adequate notice. He should not solicit
patients.
W. CuRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE, AND FoRENSIC SCIENCE 524-25 (2d ed. 1970),
quoting American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, Section 5.
48 The essential factor here is not analysis, but results, i.e. helping the patient.
To help the patient, the object is first to relieve his symptoms, to make him com-
fortable again, to restore his sense of well-being. This is an empirical approach,
to use the philosophers' concept. And the truth is that very often in medicine
this is all that the physician can accomplish even when he is sure of his diagno-
sis. There aren't as many outright "cures" in medicine as lay people imagine.
W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 67.
49 Argument is advanced that contracts to cure are against public policy. The
reason suggested is that their enforcement tends to dissuade a doctor from en-
couraging his patients and giving them hope as an important aid to their im-
provement or recovery, in the fear that his words will be taken as a promise.
The line between a promise and an opinion is not so narrow and shadowy that
language may not be well chosen to express one in clear distinction from the
other, and it is a simple matter for a doctor to make it definitb that he guarantees
no good results.
McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 302, 157 A. 881, 883 (1932).
10 Despite the statement of some courts that the two are quite distinct, there
appears to be a "gray area" where a statement could be deemed to be either a
contract or a mere reassurance. This is further complicated by the fact that in
many cases the doctor is the only person present at the time, other than those
intimately concerned with the patient's health by reason of family ties. Such
persons could easily, through honest error brought about by the extreme cir-
cumstances and emotions involved, import more meaning to the physician's
statements than they actually carry; furthermore, there is in such circumstances
a strong possibility of error in the recollection, by either party, of the actual
statements made.
Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1226-27 (1972); cf. Bailey v. Harmon, 74 Colo. 390, 222 P.
393 (1924) (plastic surgeon promised to make his patient "a model of harmonious per-
fection").
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Indeed, therapeutic reassurance may be of such psychological value that
it actually increases the probability of cure."1 These factors which
militate against finding contractual agreements may best be illustrated
by analysis of a "secondary" fact situation.
The "Secondary" Case in Praciice
The "secondary" case can be illustrated by h:ypothesizing a set of
facts similar to those in Guilmet.Y Assume that one evening the patient
began to suffer massive internal bleeding caused by a peptic ulcer. He
was rushed to the hospital where he was met by bis physician who in-
formed him that an immediate operation was necessary. As in Guilmet,
the patient inquired about the possibility of recovery and the doctor
responded that after the operation "you can throw away your pillbox,"
"it's a simple operation," and "you'll be out of work two to three weeks
at most." The patient thus gave his permission to proceed and the
physician performed the required operation. Complications arose despite
the skill of the surgeon, and the patient eventually brought an action for
alleged breach of an express agreement to cure. To hold the physician,
in this context, contractually liable for words which might be construed
as no more than therapeutic reassurance is to discourage the physician
from comforting the distraught and fearful patient and from accepting
cases where cure is improbable, for fear that some utterance in the
course of therapy might be construed as a guarantee of cure. It has
been argued that many operations which might save lives will not be
performed, either because of professional wariness or because of the
inability of the surgeon to mentally prepare his apprehensive patient
for making an affirmative decision."
If a court can determine that a set of facts constitutes a "secondary"
case, the parties' words should not be construed as words of contract.
Few if any cases, however, can be clearly categorized as "primary" or
"secondary." Thus, the law must seek a means to reconcile those factors
which favor the finding of contracts in "primary" situations and those
which militate against finding such agreements in "sccondary" situations.
This can be accomplished through the introduction of a corroborative
evidence rule."
51See generally Cannon, "Voodoo" Death, 44 Am. ANTHRO. (n.s.) 169, 180 (1942).
52 Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (197:), discussed supra notes
34-45 & text accompanying.
63 Id. at 89, 188 N.W.2d at 616 (Black, J., dissenting).
4 This rule might be adopted by the courts as a rule of prcredure, or by the legisla-
ture as a substantive requirement of the cause of action, in response to the growing
burden of malpractice litigation.
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A PROPOSAL: A CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE RULE
Under present procedures the existence of an express contract to
cure is a question of fact. Determination of this issue is left to the
jury which usually must rely solely upon its appraisal of the credibility
of the parties. It is possible that allowing the jury to determine the
existence of a contract in all circumstances permits a large number of
plaintiffs' verdicts where policy seems to demand otherwise. 5 In ad-
dition, jury bias may serve to inflate damage awards.6
In cases of high "secondary" character the law must be ready to
protect the interests of the physician. In "primary" cases the laws must
recognize the right of the parties to contract freely. Note, however, that
with the possible exceptions of cosmetic surgery, dental work and
sterilization, there are virtually no medical agreements to cure which
can be classified as derivatives of "primary" bargaining situations. One
court which sought to balance these factors noted:
These questions involve not only an interpretation of legal
history, but a balancing of the legal policies of protecting the public
in its dealings with the medical practitioner, and of protecting the
practitioner in the pursuit of his highly essential profession
from the fraudulent minded.5 7
This balancing process may be accomplished in a variety of ways:
(1) the courts could refuse to find contractual intent on the part of the
physician and thereby refuse to enforce any alleged agreement; (2) the
55 But see H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AmFEUCAN JURY 64 (1966). In the per-
sonal injury.cases examined, Kalven and Zeisel found jury verdicts for plaintiffs in 56
percent of the cases studied. Significantly, however, the judge-jury disagreement was
distributed evenly in two directions. In 12 percent of the cases it was the jury which
was more favorable to the plaintiff and in 10 percent of the cases the judge viewed the
plaintiff's case more favorably. Nevertheless it is difficult to extrapolate these results
into the area of malpractice, where, in addition to the obvious injury to the plaintiff, the
jury is bound to be influenced by the commonly known existence of medical liability in-
surance, and by the apparent breach, by the defendant, of a special, professional, fidu-
ciary relationship which existed between the parties.
56 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Withers, 192 Va. 493, 510, 65 S.E.2d
654, 663 (1951), where the court quoted from an earlier Virginia decision: "The settled
rule is that . . . there is no legal measure of damages in cases involving personal in-
juries. .. ."
"[T]he cardinal premise of common law personal injury damages is that they be not
limited by schedule but be computed de novo for each individual case. There is in brief
no standard man, no reasonable man afoot in the law of damages. . . . [T]he jury is of
necessity left free to price the harm on a case by case basis." Kalven, The Jury, the Law,
and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. LJ. 158, 160 (1958) (footnotes
omitted). See generally Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance,
18 LAw & CONTEMP. PRmO. 219 (1953).
5 7Zostautas v. St. Anthony DePadua Hosp., 23 111. 2d 326, 328, 178 N.E.2d 303, 304
(1961).
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legislature could draft a statute requiring all such agreements to be in
writing;58 or (3) the courts could require an additional consideration,
above the physician's fee, in exchange for the promise to cure."
However, to implement any of these proposals would be to give
undue weight to the policy of protecting physicians at the expense of the
policy of "freedom of contract." The patient's cause of action would be
either prohibited altogether or restricted to situations in which the
patient can produce written documentation of the agreement.
A possible resolution of these competing policies rests on proce-
dural compromise. The physician must be able to accept the improbable-
cure case, to psychologically prepare his patient for affirmative decision-
making, and to cater to the emotional needs of the distraught and fear-
ful patient without fear of subsequent legal action. On the other hand
there is no apparent reason why contracts to cure cannot be made.
The patient must retain the right to enforce such agreements upon breach
by the physician. Both of these interests can be protected through a
rule which places a heavier evidentiary burden on the patient.6 °
This burden would require the plaintiff to produce some evidence
corroborating the existence of the contract, such as a writing, proof of
additional consideration, or testimony of witnesses relating to the for-
mation of the contract. Plaintiff's testimony alone would be insufficient.
Failure to meet this burden would result in a directed verdict for the
physician.
It must be conceded, however, that the suggested approach sacrifices
the. reliance interest of the patient in order to protect the medical pro-
fession. Normally, where the defendant has made a promise on which
the plaintiff has relied to his detriment, the defendant may be estopped
from denying the enforceability of his promise. The plaintiff may
thus sue on the promise, even in the absence of consideration. Thus
the action of the plaintiff may be said to flow from his reliance interest
58 In his discussion of the Guilmet case, Professor Tierney concludes that as long as
decisions like Guilhnet stand, physicians will have ample incentive to enter defensive writ-
ten agreements with their patients. Contractual Aspects, supra rote 6, at 1479. See also
note 32 supra. He suggests that perhaps the time has come for state legislatures to re-
view the rights and duties of professionals and those who deal with them, and to ensure
by statute that a professional will be held to have warranted a -)articular result only on
the clearest proof. Contractual Aspects at 1480. The rule suggested herein can be viewed
simply as a proposed definition of what constitutes "clearest proof" under Professor
Tierney's statute.
59 See note 8 supra; cf. Jaffe, supra note 56, at 224.
60 At present the patient need only contend the words of the physician constituted
words of contract and that he was "damaged" by breach of the contract. The jury then
balances this contention with the physician's denial of contractual intent. See text ac-
companying notes 34-45 supra.
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in the promise. Policy seems to require the sacrifice of this interest in
contractual malpractice cases.
Protection of the reliance interest would allow any patient who has
suffered nonnegligent injury to claim that the words of the physician
constituted a guarantee of successful treatment. Subsequent reliance
upon the alleged promise would then be sufficient to send the question of
contract to the jury.
Admittedly, the proposed corroborative evidence rule presents
some significant opportunity for fraud on the part of the patient. In
fact, opportunity for fraud exists in the trial of most negligence actions,
and it is unfair to presume that most contractual malpractice actions
are brought by other than honest people angered by the failure of treat-
ment. In addition, it must be remembered that the corroborative proof
serves merely to get the plaintiff's cause of action past the judge, and
that a jury is sure to view with suspicion the corroboration of an oral
agreement by a spouse or close relative.6'
Another problem arising from application of this rule is that it may
prevent actions against charlatans where there is no proof of an agree-
ment other than the testimony of the plaintiff. However, alternative
remedies exist in such cases.6 2 In addition, a rule awarding punitive
damages for deliberate misrepresentation might also be adopted.6"
Despite these problems, the corroborative evidence rule presents
the benefits of (1) permitting the patient and physician to contract
freely, (2) protecting society's interests in a responsive and responsi-
ble medical profession, while (3) maintaining the patients' cause of ac-
tion against unethical medical practitioners.
To summarize, contractual malpractice cases may be analytically
classified as "primary" or "secondary." This classification is defined
by the "bargaining" atmosphere in which the alleged contract arises. It
61 A similar proposal is made in Note, Establishing the Contractual Liability of
Physicians, 7 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 84 (1974), which presents an excellent compilation and
discussion of all cases which have been decided on a contract basis. The notewriter
suggests one solution, which has been employed by some courts, in allowing recovery only
on the express terms of the contract, e.g., where specific words such as "guarantee" or
"cure" are used in the contract. (The note, however, seems to ignore the fact that most
contracts are oral, and a determination of just what was spoken is often the dispositive
question of fact.) The utterance of one word, "cure," is often sufficient to get the case
to trial, but it is not clear whether or not it is sufficient to assure liability. See, e.g., Burns
v. Barenfield, 84 Ind. 43 (1882). See also cases cited 7 U.C. DAvis L. RPv. 84, 97 n.52
(1974).
62Among those theories which might be employed in particular situations are fraud,
misrepresentation, or deceit. The theory of battery could also be employed, since the
consent of the patient to the touching would be vitiated by the misrepresentation.6 3 See Miller, supra note 24, at 428 n.61.
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must be remembered that the usual case is a hybrid, not fitting either of
the defined classifications clearly. In order to deal with such cases the
law must balance the parties' right to contract freely with the public's
interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession. This may
be accomplished through the introduction of a corroborative evidence
rule which imposes a heavier burden on the patient-plaintiff's ability to
reach the jury.
Once the existence of a contract has been established an appro-
priate damage standard must be applied. The determination of what
standard to apply, and whether the resultant damage award should in-
clude compensation for pain and suffering, has not been uniformly
resolved.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
No single rule of damages is applicable in all contractual mal-
practice cases. It is the function of the court to weigh the freedom of
contract factors which support an argument for a "benefit of the bar-
gain" damage measure against those policy factors which favor limiting
the physician's liability. The court has at its discretion reliance6' and
expectancy" measures, the application of which dep ends upon the facts
of each case.
The Expectancy Measure
Contract law generally seeks to place the injured party in as good
a position as he would have assumed upon full performance of the con-
tract.6 This includes compensation for any cor sequential damages
a4 The reliance "measure" is to be distinguished from predicating recovery on a re-
liance "interest" theory. The reliance measure is simply a me-ns to limit damages by
not awarding compensation for the lost expectancy of the plaintiff. Losses are restricted
to expenditures made in reliance upon the promise.
The reliance interest is a rationale for awarding damages where the plaintiff has
changed his position in reliance upon the defendant's promise. The reliance interest may
of course be protected by granting reliance measure damages which are designed to place
the plaintiff in as good a position as he was in before the promise was made, but not to
compensate the plaintiff for lost expectation. Recovery based on a reliance interest
theory, however, need not be limited to reliance measure damages.
65 Fuller and Perdue define expectation interest in terms of the value of the ex-
pectancy created by the promise:
[W]ithout insisting on reliance by the promisee or enrichmmt of the promisor,
we may seek to give the promisee the value of the expectancy which the promise
created. We may in a suit for specific performance actually compel the defend-
ant to render the promised performance to the plaintiff, or, irt a strit for damages,
we may make the defendant pay the money value of this performance. Here
our object is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have occupied
had the defendant performed his promise.
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936).66 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 & comment a (1932).
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which were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.67
This measure is designed to protect the expectancy interest of the plain-
tiff. Thus, in Hawkins v. McGee,"8 a leading case in which a physician
promised to convert a damaged hand into a perfect one through use of
a skin grafting process, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held
that the measure of damage was the difference between the. value of the
perfect hand as promised and the value of the damaged hand after the
operation."9
One writer has noted that the expectancy standard is based on
commercial considerations, which are foreign to the physician-patient
relationship and that such a standard runs counter to the psychological
and economic bases of the patient's complaint." At the same time this
compensatory standard imposes an inordinately severe penalty upon a
blameless physician and, in essence, leaves the precise determination of
damages to the strained imagination of the fact-finder. Hypothetical
application of the expectancy measure, for example, to a case where
the physician allegedly promised to cure a disease which was eventually
determined to be an incurable cancer, illustrates the severity of the ex-
pectancy measure.7' However, the possibility of encountering an incur-
67Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) ; RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 330 (1932).
68 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929).
69Id. at 118, 146 A. at 644 (1929). A nonsuit was ordered on a negligence count
without exception and the action was brought in assumpsit
Hawkins is the leading case on contractual malpractice. Contractual Aspects, supra
note 6, at 1463. The case is reproduced in a number of casebooks on the law of contracts,
e.g., M. FREEDMAN, CONTRACTS 8-11 (1973); L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CON-
TRACT LAW 1-4 (3d ed. 1972); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 111-13 (2d ed.
1970); I. MACNEIL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 14-17 (1971).70 Miller, supra note 24, at 424-26.
71 Miller states:
One might well speculate as to what would be the award of damages under a
similar rule where a physician promised to cure his patient of a disease which
later turned out to be incurable cancer. Ostensibly the jury would be charged
that the measure of damages would be the difference between a healthy patient
as promised and one in the plaintiff's present pathetic condition. It must be borne
in mind that even the highest degree of skill and care displayed by the defendant
in his treatment of the plaintiff would have no bearing in the ultimate result as
long as he failed to fulfill his promise, nor even, as mentioned previously, would
the fact that defendant believed at the time that the condition was incurable.
Id. at 426-27 (footnote omitted). It has been suggested that the physician might decide
to defend such an action on either of two bases: (1) the contract was void from the
outset due to impossibility of performance, or (2) that the contract was voidable due to
mistake. Id. at 427 n.55.
Miller concludes that the physician could not escape liability on either ground. With
reference to the first proposition, the physician has had the opportunity to examine the
patient and when he undertakes to effect a .cure, he necessarily undertakes the risk of
complications. Similarly, liability could not be escaped on the basis of mistake since the
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able disease is a bargained-for risk, and the physician would, presumably,
set his fee accordingly during the course of negotiation. There is ample
authority to support the view that parties may bind themselves to what
is, in fact, impossible. "It is only where the promisor has no reason to
know of the facts to which the impossibility is due, and where he does
not agree to bear the risk of their existence, that the formation of a
contract is prevented."72
Despite the flaws of the expectancy measure in the medical con-
text, the logic of recognizing the contractual malpractice action seems to
require the application of the normal contract standard.
The Reliance Measure
New York courts have been the most consistent in applying a
reliance measureY.7  Damages are restricted to payments made to the
physician, expenditures made for nurses and prescribed medication, and
"other damages that flow from the breach."74
Fuller and Perdue suggest that there are certain impulses which
cause judges to seek alternatives to the expectancy damage measure.
They further suggest that the following four considerations are con-
cealed in the objection that damages calculated under the expectancy
standard are too "uncertain":
(1) a desire not to broaden unduly the liability of a defaulter by
making "remote" injuries compensable; (2) a desire not to impose
on the defendant a liability felt to be disproportionate to the gains
which he stood to make from the contract; (3) a desire to restrict
the liability imposed on the "innocent" defaulter in comparison
mistake involved would be unilateral in nature; therefore the transaction is not made
voidable. Id. at 427 n.55 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONtRAcrs k 503 (1932)).7 2 
RESTAT.mEE OF CoNTRAcrs § 456 comment c (1932) states: "Parties deal with
reference to unknown existing factors in the same way they do with supervening events,
and so does the law." Id. at 847-48.78 See, e.g., Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Colvin v.
Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949) ; Frank v. Maliniak, 232 App. Div. 278,
249 N.Y.S. 514 (1931); Monahan v. Devinny, 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y.S. 60 (1928);
Frankel v. Volper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y.S. 15, aff'd, 223 N.Y. 582, 127 N.E. 913
(1918) ; see also Zostautas v. St. Anthony DePadua Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303
(1961).
74The phrase "other damages that flow from the breach ti-,ereof" is generally stated
without further explanation. Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. E43, 546, 127 N.E.2d 330,
332 (1955); Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 10, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795 (1949).
In New York, recovery for pain and suffering is proper only in tort actions for neg-
ligent malpractice. See Budoff v. Kessler, 2 App. Div. 2d 760, 153 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1956) ;
and cases cited note 73 supra. Accord, Harrod v. Bisson, 48 Inl. App. 549, 93 N.E. 1093
(1911) ; Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958). Contra, Stewart v.
Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
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with that imposed on the "wilful" defaulter; (4) a desire for an
easily administered rule.75
They conclude, albeit in a different context,"' that, although reliance
losses are not immune to the objection of "remoteness," such losses make
a stronger appeal to judicial sympathy than a claim for lost profits.7"
Thus, the objection of "remoteness" is applied less strictly to reliance
losses."8
It might be suggested that, in the context of medical contracts,
these four coftsiderations deserve especially great weight because cer-
tain injuries may always be considered "remote" and because of the
apparent "noncommercial" character of the contract. However, if
applied only in the medical context, this analysis seems to ignore the
underlying rationale for allowing the contract action at all. The "pri-
mary" case 7  demonstrates that the contract action is not devoid of
"commercial" aspects, and, were it not for the presence of these "com-
mercial" aspects, the law might well be persuaded by counterbalancing
policies not to enforce such agreements at all.
Use of the reliance measure suggests that no compensable damages
arise from breach by nonperformance. But, in a psychological sense,
the patient who contracts for a cure or treatment and then witnesses
breach of this agreement by his physician suffers the loss of being "de-
prived" of the promised cure. The impact of this may be greater than
that upon the merchant whose lost profits are protected by expectancy
damages.
Fuller and Perdue list numerous reasons why the law should protect
the expectation interest:8" The most persuasive in the case of an agree-
ment to cure is one which may be labeled "psychological."
Whether or not he has actually changed his position because of the
75 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 65, at 376.
76 Fuller and Perdue suggest that the objection that the expectancy measure is too
conjectural arises in two situations: (1) where the contract relates to subject matter of
uncertain value, that is, having no "market," or, (2) where the plaintiff seeks to recover
business profits which were indirectly prevented by the defendant's default. The first set
of cases, they note, has resulted in a special measure of damages where the value of ex-
pectancy is too uncertain to safely be measured in monetary terms, e.g., adoption con-
tracts and contracts to sell land. Thus the discussion of judicial factors favoring a re-
liance measure is employed primarily with respect to the discussion of lost profits. See
text accompanying note 65 supra. Nevertheless, the factors enumerated present a per-
suasive rationale for the employment of special reliance measures in contractual malprac-
tice situations. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 65, at 373-74.
77 In the context of this note, this may be read as "lost cure."
78 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 65, at 377.
79 See text accompanying, notes 34-45 supra.
80 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 65, at 57-66.
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promise, the promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such
that breach of the promise causes him to feel that he has been
"deprived" of something which was "his." 8'
Surely this expectation takes on added significance where the patient
has bargained for a personal, physical benefit.
Since the choice of a damage measure is influenced by competing
factors, it would seem best to leave the determinaticn of the appropriate
damage measure to the court.8 2
In the medical context, the peculiar facts and circumstances of
each case make judicial discretion preferable to the application of a
rigid rule. However, neither the adoption of a reliance nor an expectancy
measure determines whether recovery for pain and suffering in a con-
tract action will be allowed. It may be contended that liability for pain
and suffering which "results" from the breach was an element of the
agreement to which the physician voluntarily assented. As such, once
the existence of a contract is proven and breach is established, the
physician should be held liable for all injuries proximately caused by
the breach, includifig damages for pain and suffering.
PAIN AND SUJFFERIkG UNDER CONTRACTS TO CURE
The law has always been cautious in allowing damages for mental
suffering and emotional distress.8" The suffering of one person, under
sl Id. at 57.
32 Compare, e.g., Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955), and cases
cited note 73 supra (reliance standard), with, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146
A. 641 (1929), and McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H.. 299, 157 A. 881 (1932) (expectancy
standard).
In cases of breach of contracts to sterilize, where such an action is maintainable,
see note 20 supra, the reliance and expectancy measures would tend to equate. Both the
condition "promised" and the status quo ante position relate to preservation of the family
unit without the addition of another child. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 189 n.6
(Mass. 1973). See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 5) Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) ;
Jackson v. Anderson. 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970); cf. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
3 But there is clearly a marked trend toward recovery, see W. PIOSSFR, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw oF ToRTs, 327-28 (4th ed. 1971). The objections io damages for emotional
disturbance, applicable to both actions in tort and in contract, have been thoroughly over-
ruled in recent years. Some jurisdictions recognize the right to such recovery only in
tort actions. See cases cited note 73 supra (New York) ; see also 45 N.Y. Jua. §§ 136,
159, 178 (1973). And there are authorities that state that such damages are foreign to
all actions for breach of contract. Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529,
aff'd without opinion, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930); Monahan v. Devinny, 223 App.
Div. 547, 229 N.Y.S. 60 (1928) ; Frankel v. Wolper, "181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y.S. 15
(1918); Frechette v. Ravn, 145 Wis. 589, 130 N.W. 453 (1911). See generally 11 W.
JAEGERa, [S. WN.xIsToN,] A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcS (3d ed. 1968) § 1341.
Essentially the argument is based on the foreseeability rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). RESTATEBENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1932). A
buyer of merchandise suing the seller for breach and claiming damages for disappoint-
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precisely the same circumstances, would be no test for the suffering of
another."4 There is no true standard by which such injury can be
measured. Yet the law has come to realize that it must protect the
"personality" as well as the physical integrity of the person and that,
in certain circumstances, emotional damage must be as compensable as
physical damage.8 5 Allowing the characterization of an action as tort or
contract to determine whether emotional damage is compensable is to
pay homage to the ghosts of the common law forms of action and
thereby allow them to "rule us from their graves."8" Thus the doctrinal
bases of the contract action should not preclude recovery for pain and
suffering.
The Dual Nature of the Injury
Pain and suffering can arise in two contexts: (1) pain and suffer-
ing (both emotional and physical) which could have resulted from even
a successful treatment, and (2) needless pain and suffering encountered
during treatment or from subsequent treatments which became necessary
because of the initial breach.
As to the first point it has been suggested that pain and suffering
is a "legal detriment" which constitutes part of the consideration given
by the patient in exchange for the express guarantee.8 7  This legal
fiction emphasizes the determination of some courts not to place liability
on the physician for pain and suffering incident to treatment. The
patient in such cases is aware that such distress will result from even
the most successful treatment. He too has entered the contractual agree-
ment well aware of the uncertainty inherent in any medical procedure.
In a reliance context, the counterargument is that this suffering is
"wasted" by the breach and therefore must be compensable in order to
restore the status quo ante.88 If expectancy is the basis of the damage
measure it could be argued that placing the plaintiff in the position he
would have assumed upon complete performance still entails leaving the
ment and coincident mental anguish would probably not succeed, on the ground that the
psychological injury which occurred was not fairly foreseeable by the defendant as a
probable consequence of the breach. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 & comment
a (1932).
84 Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 262, 59 N.W. 1078, 1080 (1894).
85 Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 467, 84 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1957).
s Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795, 800, 322 P.2d 125, 128 (1958) (Finley, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, from the court's holding that pain and suffer-
ing was not recoverable). The notion that the common law forms "rule us from their
graves" is attributable to the British legal historian Maitland.87 Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 118, 146 A. 641, 644 (1929).
88 Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Mass. 1973).
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burden of this suffering upon the patient since it was incident to even
a full and successful performance of the contract.8"
Arguments may be offered for viewing the patient's distress as
either "wasted" suffering and thus compensable, or as "contracted"
suffering and thus not recoverable. In this context other factors become
determinative. It is doubtful that either the patient or the physician, at
the time of the agreement, foresaw a contract action for this suffering
if the physician, proceeding with the requisite skitl and care, could not
achieve the specified result. This is the most persaasive case for limit-
ing the liability of the physician by restricting the damages available. 0
Suffering beyond that envisaged by the treatment, as agreed, is
not susceptible to the "legal detriment" argument." The best approach
to this perplexing situation was taken by the Michigan Supreme Court
in Stewart v. Rudizer12 The court noted that in ordinary commercial
89 The doctrinal analysis which permits the pain and suffering question to surface
under either a reliance or an expectancy measure is an interesting one. Under either
measure it is arguable that the pain and suffering was accepted (that is, "given") by the
patient in exchange for the implicit promise of the physician to use due skill and care or
the express promise to cure. That is, the patient tacitly assumed the cost of pair arising
in the course of treatment. In an action predicated on qny tleory of recovery, but re-
stricted to a reliance measure of damages, it must be contended that (1) the patient only
suffered the pain in reliance upon the promise to cure, and (2) even if the pain is viewed
as consideration for the promise, it is wasted by the physiciari's breach. See text accom-
panying note 87 supra. Compare this with an expectancy measure under which the pa-
tient would contend that the purpose of the damage award is to place him in the position
he would have been in upon successful completion of the treatment and that (1) the
pain involved was extraneous or additional and unrelated to successful treatment and thus
compensable, and (2) even if this pain would have been incident to a successful treatment
it is "wasted" by the subsequent breach by the physician.
00See, e.g., Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 188-89 (Mass. 1973).
91 Such suffering can not be said to have been offered in "exchange" for the agree-
ment to cure or treat. It is barely arguable that the patient tacitly assumed the risk of
all injuries and suffering resulting from the treatment, whether they be incidental to a
successful treatment or not, and that this assumption of risk and coincident waiver of a
possible cause of action constituted at least part of the consideration given for the agree-
ment. Only under this strained construction of the agreement and its circumstances
could "nonincidental" suffering be said to constitute a "legal detriment" given in ex-
change for the promise of the physician.
92 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957), an action by a woman whose child was
stillborn against a physician for failure to perform a Caesarean section as agreed.
Justice Black, who wrote the strong dissent in the Guilnmrt case, see discussion at
notes 34-45 supra, concurred in the court's opinion authored by Justice Smith.
It is interesting to note that the law as it relates to medical contracts in Michigan is
dearly a function of the composition of the high court. On 'ay 5, 1970, Justice Black
wrote the majority decision in Guilnet (then for reversal). One supporter of that deci-
sion was eliminated by terminal illness and another by political action on November 3 of
that same year. Determination of appeal was held in abeyance for preparation of an an-
nounced minority opinion. An order for rehearing of the deadlocked appeal was eventu-
ally entered. The order eliminated the votes of the two justice3 who, but for the events
of the previous months, would have voted for reversal. Thus, as Justice Black wryly
noted in his pointed Guilmet dissent, "does the precedential law of Michigan swing back
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contracts, damages are not recoverable for disappointment, even amount-
ing to anguish.98 But, the determinative factor is the subject matter of
the agreement.9  Where the contract is not concerned with pecuniary
aggrandizement, but with matters of "moral concern and solicitude,"
the anguish which results from the breach is an integral and inseparable
part of the contract and must be compensable. 5 In general, courts ap-
pear willing to distinguish any fact situation from the application of the
no-recovery rule where such application would limit the liability of the
physician at the expense of the "innocent" patient. Thus, recovery for
pain and suffering has been allowed in jurisdictions adopting reliance'0
or expectancy17 damage measures.
and forth like a two year timed metronome." Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 76-77,
188 N.W.2d 601, 610 (Black, J., dissenting) contains Justice Black's appraisal of these
events.
93 Such damages, as the defendant contended, are often deemed to be too remote.
Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 469, 84 N.W.2d 816, 823 (1957).
94 See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973); 1 J. SUTHERLAND, A
TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 156-58 (1st ed. 1882) ; quoted in Stewart v. Rudner,
349 Mich. 459, 470-71, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (1957), states:
May damages for breach of contract include other than pecuniary elements?
-In actions upon contract, the losses sustained do not, by reason of the nature
of the transactions which they involve, embrace, ordinarily, any other than
pecuniary elements. There is, however[,] no reason why other natural and
direct injuries might not justify and require compensation. Contracts are not
often made for a purpose, the defeating or impairing of which can, in a legal
sense, inflict a direct and natural injury to the feelings of the injured party ...
While it is true that if the breach causes no actual injury beyond vexation and
annoyance, as all breaches of contract do more or less, they are not subjects of
compensation, unless to the extent that the contract was made specially to procure
exemption from them. To that extent, that is, where a contract is made to
secure relief from a particular inconvenience or annoyance, or to confer a par-
ticular enjoyment, the breach, so far as it disappoints in respect of that purpose,
may give a right to damages appropriate to the objects of the contract.
See, e.g., Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 14-15, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949) (action
for breach of contract for failure to furnish, a watertight casket and to lock the same).
Cf. McClean v. University Club, 327 Mass. 68, 97 N.E.2d 174 (1951) ; Frewen v. Page,
238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921).
95 When we have a contract concerned not with trade and commerce but with
life and death, not with profit but with elements of personality, not with pecuni-
ary aggrandizement but with matters of mental concern and solicitude, then a
breach of duty with respect to such contracts will inevitably and necessarily result
in mental anguish, pain and suffering. In such cases the parties may reasonably
be said to have contracted with reference to the payment of damages therefor
in the event of breach. Far from being outside the contemplation of the parties
they are an integral and inseparable part of it.
Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 471, 84 N.W.2d 814, 824 (1957). See Renihan v.
Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822 (1890).96 Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957) ; Frank v. Maliniak, 232
App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y.S. 514 (1931). Contra, Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795,
322 P.2d 125 (1958).
97 Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973) ; McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H.
299, 157 A. 881 (1932) ; cf. Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915).
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While damages for pain and suffering present a perplexing prob-
lem, the courts' apparent inconsistencies in approach might well be left
alone.9" It is within the purview of the court to determine whose interests
should be provided for through the damage instruction in a particular
case.99 In those instances where the court deems that the public interest
would best be served by limiting the liability of the physician, it should
be free to do. so. On the other hand, where the court feels that the
plaintiff's "bargain" warrants the protection of the law, it should be
able to apply an expectancy measure to the damage award and to include
damages for pain and suffering where they are clearly a foreseeable
consequence of the physician's breach.
CONCLUSION
A distinguished panel has recommended that legal doctrines relat-
ing to the liability of health professionals should be applied in the same
manner as they are applied to all classes of defendants.' The panel
included, as among those rules which have created significant confusion
and uncertainty in their application to malpractice actions, a rule allow-
The McQuaid court reached its conclusion through a polished use of legal fiction:
Her condition due to the treatment would reflect and show such suffering,
as practically a part of it, and enhance the difference between it and a condition
of cure. While the excess suffering would be in evidence, it would be received
only to show her condition. And such suffering as an incident of her condition
and widening the difference between her condition and cure would receive al-
lowance by reason of its inclusion in such difference.
85 N.H. at 304, 157 A. at 884. Contra, cases cited note 74 smpra.
98 Miller, supra note 24, at 428, suggests a flexible rule which would adjust to the
interests of the parties by providing (a) a tort measure of damages for fact situations
where the essential harm lies in needless actual physical injury, pain and suffering, and
(b) an "out of pocket" measure of damages providing compensation for expenses and
loss of time where there is a failure to perform but no physical harm.
However, even this rule may be too rigid in application. As stated above, the "flex-
ible" approach appears to allow no compensation for the emotional suffering of a patient
where there is no physical harm. Thus in a case where a doctr guarantees a cure for
plaintiff's back pains and months later, after exhaustive X-ray diagnosis, concludes that
no such cure is possible, the plaintiff is to be awarded only "out of pocket" damages and
receives no compensation for the emotional distress which necessarily flowed from the
doctors reevaluation (which constituted a breach). The emotional suffering was clearly
a result of the breach of the physician's guarantee and as such was a probable and fore-
seeable consequence of the breach. It appears that the better view in this instance might
well be that emotional distress was an inseparable part of the agreement and the doctor's
guarantee necessarily included a tacit assumption of the risk that subsequent failure
would lead to emotional harm. This is not to suggest that suh emotional disturbance
should always be compensable but that it may be necessary to compensate for such in-
jury, even in the absence of physical harm. The court should lie permitted such an op-
tion. The fact that plaintiffs are not generally compensated for emotional suffering in
contract actions is merely a factor for consideration, but it should not be determinative.
99 See text accompanying note 63 supra with respect to intentional misrepresentation.
1oo See note 18 suPra.
1975]
388 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:361
ing liability based on oral guarantees of specified results of treatment.
Analysis of the spectrum of contractual malpractice cases suggests
that actions for breach of express contracts should be allowed. The
requirement of corroborative evidence to prove the existence of an
agreement would protect the medical profession without sacrificing the
plaintiff-patient's common law contract action. Once a breach has been
established, the measure of damages should be determined by considera-
tion of competing policy factors rather than upon the mechanical ap-
plication of more rigid rules.
GARY L. BIRNBAUM
